

Reviews

THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS

Robert Kagan

New York: Knopf, 2008. 116pp, \$22.95 cloth (ISBN 978-0307269232)

The controversial author of this short book—really an extended essay—rejects the label “neoconservative” but has long advocated a muscular, typically neoconservative US foreign policy founded on, and justified by, America’s unique combination of power and righteousness. Kagan worked in the State Department during the Reagan administration, co-founded (with William Kristol) the Project for the New American Century in 1997, pushed the Clinton administration to adopt a policy of regime change in Iraq, and was one of the most prominent defenders of President George W. Bush’s invasion of that country in 2003. He has therefore been held co-responsible for a shift in American foreign policy that many regard as a disastrous error fuelled by arrogance and ignorance.

The long and difficult trajectory of the Iraq war and the failure of its stated justifications (Saddam’s non-existent WMDs) caused many neocons to reassess their previous positions. Perhaps the most telling recantation was that of Francis Fukuyama, whose book *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, singled out Kagan in particular as a champion of the idea of benevolent American hegemony. Fukuyama argued that the neocons, having misattributed the fall of the Soviet Union to a virile show of American strength, wrongly assumed that

the virtuous progress of history toward democracy could be accelerated by aggressive American agency. The misadventures of Iraq, he wrote, gave the lie to this, and future administrations would have to persuade the world, first, that America was good and, second, that it could be wise in its application of power, emphasizing military power less and “soft power” more.

The very title of Kagan’s book suggests a riposte to Fukuyama, whose most famous work is *The End of History*. Kagan rejects pusillanimous revisionism and adopts attack as the best defence. An extract from this book in the *New Republic* caused a furor accompanied by accusations that he is merely repackaging old positions. He argues that “the great fallacy of our era”—an old Enlightenment one revitalized by the collapse of communism—is a deterministic belief in the progress of liberal ideas and institutions, an unwarranted confidence in humanity’s inevitable forward march toward peaceful and prosperous coexistence (102). Recent developments—in particular the rise of China and the turning away of Putin’s Russia from western-style democracy—have revealed this pleasant vision to be a mirage. History has returned with a vengeance, propelled by the ambition, pride, and fear of competitive, mutually suspicious, and potentially hostile nation-states. In an anarchic world, such states are not reliably restrained by international laws and institutions, or even by growing economic interdependence, and naturally seek enhanced security in military preparedness. Moreover, an excess of power inevitably breeds discontent with the status quo and a desire for greater influence in the world, as well as for the respect and honour that great power always commands. Witness Iran with its nuclear ambitions, or even democratic India whose economic transformation has caused “the power of argument” to be displaced by “the argument of power” (42).

This sounds perfectly realist, yet Kagan argues that it is not just differentials of power that matter. Values do, too. Ideological competition may be a thing of the past, but the world continues to resist convergence in value terms because some of the major players are autocracies. The leaders of China and Russia and nations that take heart from their example are not merely cynical autocrats; they *believe* in autocracy. Democratic factionalism, they claim, is dangerous to stability, and so-called universal liberal values are merely the impositions of western power. The international liberal order does not imply progress for them but oppression, for it questions “the fundamental legitimacy of governments, which for autocracies can be a matter of life and death” (67). Their foreign policy must therefore include the defence of autocracy itself, and this presents a much more significant

challenge to the west than Islamism's ultimately futile resistance to modernity. The world of competitive nation states is thus patterned by a larger competition between democracies and autocracies, and since democracy will not come about automatically, one must choose which side to support.

If there are few explicit retractions in this analysis, there is certainly a shift of emphasis from Kagan's best known previous work, *Of Paradise and Power*. There he contrasted an effeminized Europe indulging a fairy-tale world of international law, multilateral cooperation, and perpetual peace with a United States that remained "mired in history," wielding power (unilaterally if necessary) in a Hobbesian world where security relied ultimately on military might (which, by the way, provided the essential shield under which a weak Europe could indulge its utopian fantasy). This contrast remains but is softened in the interests of advocating a united democratic front against the challenge of autocratic power. Kagan floats the idea of a "concert of democracies" that would "complement" the United Nations—whose security council is largely nullified by the split between democracies and autocracies—and other global organizations (97). In keeping with his newly multilateralized approach, Kagan asserts the importance of American power but in somewhat chastened form, a reflection of the erosion of legitimacy suffered through recent unilateralist actions. American power may not be always wisely used, says Kagan, but would anyone else do better? And at any rate this power remains vital for balancing and moderating regional powers that distrust and despise one another much more than they hate America. The safest bet thus remains an international system based on "one superpower and several great powers," in other words on the continuance of benign American hegemony with the crucial support of democratic allies (92).

One doesn't have to be a neocon to agree with this. What is in effect demanded is that the US continue to bear the "ethical burden of power" it has so often wished to avoid but has nevertheless consistently borne since World War II (52). Ironically, Kagan's ultimate position is not so far from that of John Ikenberry, who argues that the liberal international system constructed during the Cold War depended on America acting as a "restrained hegemonic power." Other western countries acquiesced willingly in this system because they shared America's democratic and capitalist-development values and benefited from the order created, an order that deserved to be sustained and extended after the Cold War. Ikenberry

presumes, in other words, that power may support international community rather than destroy it. It is not clear that Kagan can logically assume the same, though his prescriptions seem to require it. Kagan insists that we cannot speak of an “international community” where there is no agreement on international norms, morality, or conscience, but the corollary of this is that we *can* speak of such a community when common norms exist (76). This seems confirmed by his hope for a concert of democracies and his comment that “a democratic Russia and China would be better international partners” (99).

The problem is that such moderate views sit oddly with Kagan’s initial, ultra-realist analysis of the apparently invariable behaviour of *all* nations which, never satisfied with a little power, must seek to expand it, thus perpetuating the endless competition of power politics that marks the “return of history.” It is surely useful to be reminded that the international triumph of liberal democratic values, implicitly leading to a less dangerous world, is not preordained but must be won politically, and that material and military power is not irrelevant in the contest. But to presume, as Kagan seems to, that such a triumph is even a possibility is already to transcend the narrow power realism with which he begins.

John Kane/Griffith University

OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS

Success and Failure in Military Occupation

David M. Edelstein

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. 235pp, US\$35.00 cloth (ISBN 978-0-8014-4615-3)

As new US administration officials inherit the daunting task of managing reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, they would do well to read David Edelstein’s thought-provoking book on the comparative political dynamics of military occupations. In this timely and well-written study, the author reminds us that successful military occupations have been relatively rare occurrences in the history of international relations and that the often-cited model cases of the US postwar occupations of Japan and Germany succeeded for very specific, yet rarely specified, reasons.

The author explores the circumstances in which military occupations are likely to succeed, which he judges by “looking at the short- and long-term accomplishments of an occupation relative to the expense of the occupation” (8). Drawing upon concepts from classic realist international relations theory, Edelstein argues that the presence of an external security threat makes an occupied society more likely to comply with the demands and directives issued by the occupying power than in cases where such an external threat is absent. Of the 26 cases that the author identifies as the universe of historical military occupations, seven are classified as successes, 14 as failures, and five as displaying mixed results (28). Tellingly, in five out of the seven success cases, the occupied state faced a threatening external security environment. And it is precisely the presence of such an external threat—the Soviet Union—that contributed to the relative success of the United States-led postwar occupations of Germany and Japan.

The book’s chapters are helpfully organized by analytical theme and blend both theoretical discussion and case studies. Within each chapter, Edelstein addresses a specific question related to occupations—when and how to occupy (chapters 1 and 2), when to leave (chapter 3), and the effectiveness of multilateral vs. unilateral occupations (chapter 4)—and then fleshes out his analytical expectations. He illustrates these expectations with an instructive set of case comparisons, drawing upon both better-known and more obscure historical cases. The most compelling of these, and a fascinating natural social science experiment in its own right, is his comparison in chapter 2 of the United States’ mixed success in South Korea with the Soviet Union’s relatively more successful occupation of North Korea. In chapter 3, which addresses timing, Edelstein’s discussion of the US’s premature departure from Cuba in 1902 also makes for an effective comparison with the well-judged duration of the US occupation of Japan, as well as Great Britain’s 72-year imbroglio in Egypt.

Edelstein’s explanatory logic is straightforward and clear, but the approach invites three concerns. First, his focus on the realist concepts of external security threats sits uneasily with the arguments he subsequently advances in chapter 2 about the strategies of accommodation and inducement that occupiers adopt, in addition to coercion, when dealing with local intermediaries in the occupied polity. The problem of aligning incentives between occupier and intermediary agents is a critically important and frequently noted problem amongst scholars of empire, but such control problems are rooted in the challenges brought by the delegation inherent in

all hierarchical relationships, not in the external environment that the author privileges.

Second, many will challenge the criteria upon which Edelstein distinguishes his 26 cases of occupation from cases of colonialism. The author argues that occupations differ from colonial rule in that the occupying power intends to leave the target country once its objectives have been fulfilled. Yet discerning an occupier's initial intentions is difficult and seems at odds with the structural factors that the author privileges elsewhere in his explanatory framework. Moreover, there is no inherent reason why the organizational dynamics and administrative challenges faced by a colonial power cannot be compared with that of an occupier. As Edelstein himself acknowledges, the Soviet control of eastern Europe featured many structural characteristics of occupation and political control, yet this universe of cases and other potentially instructive cases of informal empire, colonialism, and trusteeship are also excluded from the study. Yet comparing cases of colonialism with military occupations might also yield additional practical insights. Not coincidentally, the special operations department of the US Pentagon screened the film *The Battle of Algiers* to encourage fresh thinking about coping with the insurgency in Iraq.

Third, while Edelstein convincingly rejects the alternative hypotheses that the amount of resources expended by the occupier or the level of economic development in the target country might affect the success of the occupation, he overlooks two other potentially key explanations. Social constructivists working on issues of hierarchy and international order have emphasized the importance of forging shared identities, especially when creating a security community or alliance system in a postconflict environment. In the German case, for instance, Patrick Jackson has argued that the western occupying powers successfully engineered Germany's postwar rehabilitation and transatlantic integration by emphasizing its supposedly common western heritage and values. Alternatively, simple organizational and administrative competence—of which we saw few signs in Iraq under the coalition provisional authority—could also explain the relative success of the Japanese and German cases compared with Iraq and other recent post-Cold War cases. Certainly, few observers of the international administration of Kosovo or Bosnia would dispute that the unclear and overlapping jurisdictional mandates of international administrators, a multiplicity of competing external actors, and a poorly supervised system of reconstruction financing contributed to substandard outcomes in those cases.

Occupational Hazards is an important contribution that applies time-honoured realist concepts to a timely and practically important subject. Though scholars and policymakers may disagree with Edelstein's theoretical approach and empirical scope, all should refer to this book as an important marker in the evolution of our thinking about the dynamics of military occupations.

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FREEDOM'S BATTLE

The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention

Gary Bass

New York: Knopf, 2008. 528pp, US \$35.00 cloth (ISBN 978-0307266484)

The calls to action are familiar. The foreign correspondent's account of bodies pulped and corpses dismembered. The howls of the victims in the recollections of one or two survivors. The plunder of cities and the inevitable epidemic of rape.

The pathology of mass violence recurred too frequently in the 20th century. Armenia, Nanking, Auschwitz, Biafra, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Sarajevo. The list is partial, but it conjures that century's special horrors. But what did such nightmares mean for those who observed from afar? What did they owe to victims of whom they, in the infamous phrase of British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, "knew nothing" (19)?

Such ethical dilemmas were not original to the 20th century. They can, as Gary Bass argues in his impressive new book, be traced back to at least the 1820s. In a landmark account of the early politics of humanitarian intervention, Bass broadens our historical horizons to encompass atrocities that other authors have overlooked. Scio, Damascus, Batak. These were among the 19th century's worst outrages. They were also the subject of fierce discussion between aroused "atrocitarians" and conservative non-interveners in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

Repeatedly, Bass tells us, the 19th-century powers decided for intervention. In his main case studies—Greece in the 1820s, Syria in the 1860s, and Bulgaria in the 1870s—the interventions were successful and constructive. Even more striking, they proceeded with multilateral support

and in a non-imperial manner. There is much to learn, the author contends, from this off-disregarded history.

And there is much for readers to learn from the book that Bass has written. Erudite, provocative, and richly researched, *Freedom's Battle* offers a panorama of the 19th century's complex humanitarian politics. Adeptly relating the domestic politics of the great powers to the spectre of foreign violence, Bass explains why the human dimension of overseas conflict became a concern for governments in the 19th century. And as he traces the story of intervention from Greece to Armenia, he develops a stridently original account of that century's international relations.

Readers will not be surprised to find that the idea of national sovereignty is an early victim of Bass's revisionist history. The abusers of human rights, of course, have recurrently "cloaked" atrocities behind such legalese, while realist theory tends to view humanitarian intervention as "either foolish, fake, or irrelevant" (511, 16). For Bass, this is all too much hypocrisy. Sovereignty in the 19th century, he points out, was readily breached. Under the Vienna concert, conservatives claimed the right to intervene against revolutionaries in foreign lands. With the advent of humanitarian politics, fuelled by mass media, liberals simply claimed a similar prerogative for their own convictions.

By recapturing the fury and the effectiveness of 19th-century humanitarianism, Bass dismisses old stereotypes of the century as a time of callous deference to sovereign norms. At the same time, some readers may object that his argument obfuscates the limits of his evidence. Bass does not, it must be said, satisfactorily answer the concern that each of his major case studies involves an Ottoman province. This leaves open the question of just how far his historical conclusions can reach. Was 19th-century sovereignty really as porous as Bass would have us believe, or was the Ottoman empire, with its unique position in the states system, unusually riddled with holes?

Regardless, *Freedom's Battle* teaches important lessons. This is partly because the conclusions that Bass offers would-be interveners are eminently sensible. But it is mostly because Bass's principal case studies—the European interventions in Greece in 1827, Syria in 1860, and Bulgaria in 1877—offer rich seams of experience, which the author mines with an adept eye for historical lessons and analogies.

First, Bass insists that intervening powers should work with local authorities wherever possible. Syria is the paramount example. Threatened with European action, Ottoman officials in 1860 proved so eager to punish

the persecutors of Maronite Christians that they executed suspected perpetrators with ruthless abandon. In Greece and Bulgaria, where Ottoman officials were less willing to cooperate, British diplomats sustained open communications and worked to broker compromise settlements. Even when domestic constituencies bayed for war, as the London Philhellenes did in the 1820s, great powers were still able to accomplish some good through diplomacy.

But when dialogue fails, there may be no resort but war. Should force be necessary, Bass contends, it should be multilaterally sanctioned. In 1827, it was a combined European fleet that defeated Ottoman forces at Navarino. While France dominated the 1860 Syrian intervention, Britain's participation constituted a vital restraint. In contrast, Russia's 1877 decision for war was unilateral, but even then British diplomats worked to prevent a punitive peace. In each of these cases, Bass concludes, the collaboration of intervening powers—whose own interests in the cases were often divergent—played a crucial role in limiting the scope of the operations.

Would-be interveners, Bass insists, must avoid “mission creep” at all costs. Taking issue with the proponents of a postmodern “empire lite,” Bass rejects the conflation of imperialism and humanitarian intervention (377). His 19th-century cases, after all, reveal the temptations of staying too long. Yet, by defining clear objectives, by working with local powers, and by seeking multilateral sanction, intervention need not be imperial. It cannot afford that taint, Bass insists, if it is to constitute part of a “wider grand strategy of free republics” for the achievement of a liberal international order (381).

This may sound like an ambitious goal, but Bass's insights about how to do humanitarian intervention will strike most readers as more sensible than radical. That said, the reasonableness of this book's conclusions should not obscure the innovativeness of its method. By pushing deep into history, Bass has moved the conversation on humanitarian intervention beyond the entreaties of well-wishers and theorists. Thanks to *Freedom's Battle*, we now have a much better idea of what collaborative great-power intervention looks like in practice. That, in itself, makes this book essential reading.

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THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY

Lessons from Practice and Research

Jorge Domínguez and Anthony Jones, editors

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. 272 pp, US \$50.00 cloth
(ISBN 978-0801885952)

This book draws together papers and smaller contributions to a conference on democratic consolidation held in Madrid in the fall of 2001, several weeks after the terrorist attacks of 11 September. The editors of the volume note that the event was “planned long before those terrible events” and so “the organizers of the conference went ahead as scheduled, in part to affirm the value of constitutional democracy as it faced yet another dramatic peril” (5). The meeting was a combination of an academic conference of professors and political summit of former presidents and prime ministers of countries that had moved away from authoritarianism since the 1970s. After the meeting, several of the political leaders organized the “club of Madrid,” an NGO devoted to “strengthening democracy around the world.” Madrid itself became the site of the next major terrorist attack, on 11 March 2004, and it is understandable that with so much world historical substance on the line, the club decided to commemorate the event by sponsoring a volume.

I mention the background to the book because it is important for understanding its otherwise unconventional structure. Eight solid chapters written by academics in the idiom of political science are followed by six much shorter commentaries by former and sitting presidents, prime ministers, and members of government from Latin America, Europe, and India. The academic chapters are useful summaries about what we know about various aspects of democracy-building and democratic consolidation. Some take on the voice of advice to the prince but most have a deep appreciation for the gap between comparative politics as a vocation and the real world of political judgment.

In a thoughtful contribution on public participation in new democracies, Grzegorz Ekiert and Anna Grzymala-Busse discuss the kinds of dilemmas involved in constructing a robust pluralism. For example, research has shown that a highly mobilized and active civil society can be used to consolidate and to destabilize democracies. In Poland, contentious politics contributed to speedy economic reform and democratic accountability when the parliamentary and party institutions were still relatively weak. Whether popular mobilization and participation is good or bad for democracy depends

on whether it is responsible (that is, it excludes extremists), representative (the gold standard here is universal suffrage and social inclusion), and responsive (it reacts to those it purports to represent). International support can help new democracies attain all of these goods by assisting “nonviolent, pro-democratic associations that have unconstrained membership” but, on the other hand, the authors note “public authorities and international actors should steer clear of either interfering in the internal affairs of civil society organizations or stifling their growth, mission, and relations with their own constituencies through financial or technical dependence” (31). Assisting these organizations without interfering with them may, however, not be easy.

In a valuable chapter on the new politics of constitutionalism, Richard Simeon and Luc Turgeon note that constitution-writing is not as easy as it used to be. In past centuries, two dozen (white) men could sit in a room for weeks or months at a time with no broader public input and come up with a document in the name of the “people” and have the process and final product considered legitimate. This is no longer true. Constitution-making has been democratized (and complicated) in a number of ways. Not only must broader groups of citizens be including in the drafting but the document itself is no longer seen as an eternal contract or a defining moment, but rather as an evolving “conversation” that may change over time. Furthermore, constitutions are not only prescriptive in the sense of laying out the political structures and general rules of the game, but also descriptive in the sense of being big identity statements. This opens the way for questioning who is the “we” in the “we the people” statement. With these considerations in mind, Simeon and Turgeon write, “Avoiding the dual problem of an insecure majority that represses or dominates the minority, and an insecure minority that rebels or secedes, is a requirement for consolidation of democracy” (82). The authors, both experts on the thorny questions of English-French politics in Canada, are well aware that even in a consolidated democracy this tension may not be resolved in an entirely satisfying manner.

The chapters on legislative-executive relations (by Antônio Octávio Cintra and Marcello Barroso Lacombe) and the military and politics (by Rut Diamint) both stick to conventional wisdom in comparative politics. If you are going to choose institutions for a new democracy, opt for parliamentary systems over presidential. Parliamentary democracies are less prone to gridlock, corruption, and the accumulation of power in the executive. Yet there is reason to believe that institutional choice may be endogenous to the

situation in a given country and for the presidential systems of Latin America the path forward remains unclear. Diamint identifies the importance of separating military from police functions in new democracies, especially in Latin America where the two have often been conflated. Her advice is to concentrate on organizational reforms and community policing in an effort to make the gradual transition from cold war national security to a conventional (if seemingly intractable) fight against crime.

The chapters by José Luis Méndez and Susan Rose-Ackerman focus on the state and corruption. Corrupt regimes, democratic or otherwise, that fail to deliver public goods will quickly lose support. Méndez's recommendation to privatize some services, decentralize their provision to the local level, and modernize the bureaucracy through civil service reform—ideology aside—may have seemed pressing in 2001 and may reappear on the agenda in the future, but in 2009, when states everywhere are losing capacity, it seems a bit quaint. Rose-Ackerman questions these recommendations implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) in her important chapter.

In fact, the quality of the state may be the most important issue confronting newly consolidated democracies. State-building is the new frontier of democratization studies. New democracies tend to be poorer than older ones and poor countries have high levels of corruption, mainly because police and minor bureaucrats are underpaid and require graft to get by. The result is inferior provision of public goods, slow growth, and more corruption. The promised land may be democracy and prosperity but for too many states there appears to be no way of “getting there from here.” The democratic leaders' short contributions at the end of the book remind us that Samuel Huntington's injunction, articulated in the first sentence of *Political Order in Changing Societies*, that countries are best distinguished not by type of government but by degree of government, may be more of a challenge to democrats today than when he originally wrote it.

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FINANCING DEVELOPMENT

The G8 and UN Contribution

Michele Fratianni, John J. Kirton, and Paolo Savona, editors

Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007. 321pp, US \$99.95 cloth (ISBN 978-0754646761)

Anyone who aims to assemble an overview of development finance—an enormous subject—faces daunting challenges. One must examine problems from the perspectives of both the governments and organizations doing the lending and setting policy and of those on the ground who receive and spend the money. One has to confront both global trends and geographically narrow local realities. *Financing Development: The G8 and UN Contribution* attempts to navigate these treacherous waters, focusing on questions from the top down and offering recommendations for government policy, largely neglecting the role of grass-roots nongovernmental organizations in the development process. And while many contributors suggest that the status quo needs to change, most merely recommend rejigging reporting frameworks and increasing government-to-government communication.

Trade reform receives close attention. Myles Wickstead, George von Furstenberg, Sheila Page, Sylvia Ostry, and Robert Fauver argue that increasing market access for third-world agricultural products can be as important to development as multilateral aid. As Fauver puts it, “nothing can stimulate development as much as participation in the global trading system” (237). This participation must include special and differential treatment within the context of the Uruguay WTO round and the Doha development round. Underlining this point, Princeton Lyman argues that “treating Africa as an object of charity, rather than a potential partner, does no service to Africa” (126). While the contributors do not suggest that trade reform is a panacea, they convincingly demonstrate that the opening of European and American markets will encourage African governments to reform their trading policies and help to attract needed foreign investment.

Students of governance will especially enjoy the critical examination of the effects that the G8, Commonwealth, and Francophonie have had on African governance. At times, G8 development efforts have contributed to corruption (for instance when aid officers turn a blind eye to local officials’ overseas caches of stolen funds). As a solution to this problem, Ade Afuye suggests that the G8 establish a mechanism to investigate the track records of companies competing for development contracts (150).

Wickstead’s review of the UK’s Commission for Africa is one of the book’s highlights. His review of the commission’s history, governance, and

conclusions is masterful, and lends weight to his insistence that the G8 and the UN must complete the “unfinished business” of the commission’s recommendations on aid, debt, and trade (138).

Von Furstenberg challenges many of the recommendations that Jeffrey Sachs advanced in his popular book *The End of Poverty*. He argues that G8 and UN aid should travel through national institutions instead of, as Sachs argues, bypassing them. Following Sachs’s advice would only weaken these frail institutions further, and aid flows would serve only as a palliative, solving short-term problems but exacerbating the instability of recipient governments. Instead of the “mountains of bold-faced, finely detailed, and commanding recommendations in the hundreds of pages of the report of the [Commission for Africa],” von Furstenburg argues that the G8 should “limit the application of bypass strategies...[and] follow a differentiated strategy that rewards good governance, not good rulers” (172-73).

The volume’s ambition sometimes leads it astray. Victoria Panova’s review of Russia’s place in the G8 is out of place in a collection on development finance and Africa. Moreover, the book covers such a wide range of issues—including African financial needs, traditional development finance instruments, and the millennium development goals—that it can be easy for readers to get lost. Some thematic sections, for instance on the Gleneagles summit (which occupies nearly half of the volume), get bogged down. John Kirton’s blow-by-blow account of Tony Blair and the British sherpas’ efforts to design a successful meeting is unnecessarily detailed.

The strong tone of paternalism in some of the chapters is disappointing. For example, Nicholas Bayne’s review of the Gleneagles summit begins by describing how Tony Blair changed the G8 agenda: “The changes were intended to enable the summit to meet its original objectives better. These objectives remained valid: political leadership...collective management of the international system by Europe, North America, and Japan; and reconciling the international and domestic pressures generated by globalization” (25). Bayne’s endorsement of the notion that non-OECD nations should not participate in international governance seems to come from a bygone era. In a similar vein, Lyman assumes that G8 and UN commitments, programs, and initiatives are necessarily beneficial and suggests that African partner states should replicate them. “Few African oil-producing countries,” he writes, “have begun to implement the procedures under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which was specifically endorsed by the G8” (125). Yet the G8’s endorsement of EITI has no bearing on whether its procedures are appropriate for African countries.

Financing Development is a useful, if sometimes awkward, addition to the field of development finance. Students of multilateral organizations (particularly the G8) will find that the first half of the book furnishes a solid basis for further research. Students of development aid and finance will likewise find the second half—especially on the links between the G8 and Africa—informative. Few readers will find the entire volume worthwhile.

Amiel Blajchman/Globalis Group

THE WORLD IN CANADA

Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics

David Carment and David Bercuson, editors

Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008. 256pp, \$29.95 paper (ISBN 978-0-7735-3297-7)

As the co-editors, David Carment and David Bercuson, suggest in their introduction, the purpose of this book is to survey the recent changes in Canada's "ethnic mosaic" and assess the impacts of those changes on foreign policy (4). In the chapters that follow, the focus appears to be on recent immigrant communities and the Québécois, while older minority communities such as First Nations and Ukrainians are missed out. They admit to an assumption of "linkage politics," the notion that a porous domestic-international divide ensures that foreign policy elites must to some extent adapt their goals to reflect their constituents' opinions (5). Long-term demographic change within Canada at the very least constrains future foreign policy goals.

The first chapter immediately confounds the reader. Taking the "Canada as small-power" thesis to an extreme, Adam Chapnick argues that the question of the prime minister's impact on Canadian foreign policymaking is largely irrelevant because the office's occupants have rarely had a "measurable impact" on international affairs (16). He supports this extreme position with dubious claims, for instance by arguing that the Canada-US free trade agreement lacks significance for anyone in the long run. Regardless of the veracity of his revisionist thesis, the reader must ask how this piece is relevant to the rest of the collection. Indeed the basic claim that Canadian policy is insignificant threatens to undercut the whole purpose of the book.

A better introduction to the collection is the second chapter, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon's overview of immigration to Canada and its impact on Canadian foreign policy. After a brief description of the major immigration trends, she surveys the foreign policy interests of recent immigrant communities, including attitudes towards a more liberal immigration and refugee policy and ties to home countries. She also assesses their potential for influence through the electoral process and NGOs.

In the first half of chapter 3, Andrew Harrington, Stewart Prest, and Per Unheim present interesting case studies of the criminal connections between Jamaica and Haiti and their respective diasporas in Toronto and Montreal. They argue that criminal deportation and illegal immigration have fostered a transnational conduit between Canada and the Caribbean for drugs and criminal gangs. This study is the most information-intensive in the collection (as its large number of footnotes attests) and may provide readers with data they would not otherwise encounter. The authors then shift focus to show how this transnational conduit might be used to alleviate the chronic poverty and instability in the diasporas' home countries. But this approach then begs for a similar analysis of the conduit's impact on the Canadian state.

J.L. Granatstein wants to discuss this impact in chapter 4, "Multiculturalism and Canadian foreign policy." He poses a series of provocative questions: does a policy of multiculturalism lead inevitably to foreign policy pacifism and neutralism? What happens when dual loyalties conflict? What duties do immigrants have to their new state? How active can they remain in the politics of their state of birth (up to and including terrorism)? These are important questions and could be debated on their own moral grounds. But Granatstein reverts to the old dichotomy between national interests and values and argues that only the former should determine foreign policy. The frailness of this bifurcation is evident in the fifth national interest he enumerates—"work with like-minded states for the protection and enhancement of democracy and freedom"—which is clearly value-laden (80). (Granatstein's five national interests are very similar to my own scheme except that mine keeps the ideological one—the projection of a national identity—generic and requires no dichotomy between values and interests.) A diversion into a heated attack on Québec's alleged historic over-influence on Canadian foreign policy further weakens Granatstein's incomplete discussion.

David Haglund also confronts some of these issues in his chapter. He lays out a theoretical framework for discussing emigration's impact on

“identity” (or national character) but, unfortunately, does nothing with it. His analysis of Québec’s impact on recent Canadian foreign policy is more useful and largely debunks Granatstein’s “wag-the-dog” thesis. Haglund also considers the anti-American inclinations of various ethnicities and their long-term impact on US-Canadian relations, citing the example of Irish immigration to the US, which delayed (or complicated) the US-UK rapprochement before the First World War.

The volume also contains detailed case studies of individual communities. Sami Aoun’s discussion of why the Arab and Muslim communities in Canada have not developed effective foreign policy lobbying capacity is thought-provoking. He attributes the failure to a series of obstacles, including cognitive faults and misperceptions and intense divisions within the communities themselves. As a consequence, consensus has been elusive among Canadian Arabs and Muslims on such issues as Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Darfur.

According to Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley’s contribution, recent Liberal governments formulated Canadian homeland security policy to accommodate the interests of business elites, developmental goals in Haiti, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and also to win electoral favour among immigrants from those three countries in key ridings in Toronto and Montreal. To justify these empirical assertions, the authors skip blithely from neopluralist theory to public choice theory to a “network theory of migration” (141). They spend too much time on the first assertion, attempting to show a mass-elite gap by comparing the text of the 2005 international policy statement to general public opinion. This chapter would have been stronger had it focused solely on demonstrating the claim about overseas development goals.

Evan Potter’s interesting and comprehensive study of survey data on Canada-US relations offers an opportunity to test Haglund’s concern about faster growing anti-Americanism in immigrant communities. However, he discusses the attitudes of non-Francophone minorities only in passing. His excellent graphs do compare the attitudes of Canada- and foreign-born Canadians across a number of issues, but he rarely discusses the difference and offers no indication of statistical significance. Overall, Potter finds the divergence between these two groups to be small. It is nowhere near the magnitude of the gulf between Québec and the rest of Canada.

Perhaps the best chapter (certainly the most complete and focused) is Stéphane Roussel’s and Charles-Alexandre Théorêt’s analysis of the evolution

of the Bloc Québécois's defence policy. Contrary to expectations that a separatist policy would be limited to narrow self-interests and Québec nationalism, the authors find that the Bloc's positions are more consistently Pearsonian and internationalist than those of the other federal parties. Nelson Michaud's chapter, which also deals with Québec, reiterates the arguments for giving the provincial government a greater international role, based on his own framework of interests and constraints.

Can any treatment of this subject avoid sliding into a general debate on the merits of current multicultural and immigration policy? While 9/11 and security concerns about home-grown terrorists cast long shadows here, few of the contributors tackle those subjects directly. Some chapters promise much more in their introductions than they deliver (e.g. Granatstein, Haglund, and Leuprecht and Hataley). Other chapters are unrelated, either in whole or in part, to the volume's ethnic and demographic focus (e.g. Chapnick and Leuprecht and Hataley). The result is a hodge-podge, frustratingly inadequate at times, thought-provoking at others.

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